Us vs. Them as Structural Equivalence: Analysing Nationalist Discourse Networks in the Georgian Print Media by Abzianidze, Nino
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 243–256
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i2.2605
Article
Us vs. Them as Structural Equivalence: Analysing Nationalist Discourse
Networks in the Georgian Print Media
Nino Abzianidze
Department of Political Science, Central EuropeanUniversity, 1051Budapest, Hungary; E-Mail: nina.abzianidze@gmail.com
Submitted: 31 October 2019 | Accepted: 20 March 2020 | Published: 2 June 2020
Abstract
Nationalist discourse has been identified as a driving factor in the causal chain linking democratization to the likelihood
of ethnic conflicts, due to its nature of polarizing us against others along ethnic lines. However, we lack systematic knowl-
edge of the structure and dynamics of this polarization. Adding to the established practices of analysing in-group/out-group
divisions in ideological and political discourses, this article proposes an innovative way of measuring the divisiveness of na-
tionalist discourse using social network analysis. Instead of looking at direct nationalist interaction between actors, deeper
discursive structures are found by analysing indirect relationships across actors, based on their nationalist interaction with
third parties. In this manner, it is possible to identify whether certain actors form structurally similar clusters, based on
whom they direct their nationalist appeals to, how intense these appeals are towards specific actors, and what other
groups they are targeted by themselves. By applying the measure of Structural Equivalence to the original data on na-
tionalist appeals obtained from the quantitative content analysis of the Georgian print media across the 20 years of its
democratization (1991–2012), this article shows that the actor structure of nationalist discourse conveys information on
group polarization. Further, it demonstrates that the divisiveness of this discourse in Georgia became sharper during elec-
toral periods, with the first two elections after independence being particularly dangerous in this regard.
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1. Introduction
Conflict researchers, who have found evidence that elec-
toral periods in democratizing countries increase the
risks of violent conflicts, identify nationalist discourse
in media as a major mechanism driving the causal pro-
cess between the two variables (Cederman, Gleditsch,
& Hug, 2013; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005; Snyder, 2000).
According to this argument, relative liberalization of the
public sphere, and an increasing degree of political par-
ticipation in post-authoritarian states, incentivize both
old and new actors to mobilize resources—including
their control of media—to win mass support. Carrying
the legacies of authoritarian political culture, these ac-
tors do not have strong policy platforms they can rely
on. Therefore, nationalism becomes the “universal” cate-
gory to appeal to (Snyder & Ballentine, 1996). But, apart
from creating feelings of cohesion within the members
of a national in-group, appealing to national sentiments
also risks creating aversion towards the national or eth-
nic ‘others.’ Whether targeting groups within or beyond
state borders, these appeals are particularly dangerous
if saturated with hostile references. It is in these cir-
cumstances that nationalist polarization between us and
them occurs, which can contribute to conflict escalation
under the conditions of weak political institutions in de-
mocratizing countries (Cederman, Hug, & Wenger, 2008;
Mansfield & Snyder, 1995).
Despite focusing extensively on the importance of na-
tionalist discourse, this strand of the literature offers lit-
tle systematic knowledge about its structure and dynam-
ics. As a result, we also lack empirical evidence suggest-
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ing the intensification of divisive nationalist discourse
during electoral periods. Based on an analysis of the print
media of Georgia—a typical case of democratization and
conflict—this article addresses the problem by identify-
ing empirically if, how andwhen the nationalist discourse
in media is at its most divisive.
To this end, taking the structural perspective and ex-
tending on the methodology of discourse network analy-
sis (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012), nationalist discourse is con-
ceived in this article as a social network wherein actors
are engaged in nationalist interaction, i.e., sending, and
targeted by, nationalist appeals. This proposition, which
relies on the approach to the study of nationalist dis-
course byAbzianidze (2020), implies an innovativeway of
conceptualizing and measuring the in-group/out-group
structure of this discourse, based on the structural simi-
larities and differences of the actors sending nationalist
appeals to, and receiving them from, the same other ac-
tors. Rather than simply focusing on dyadic interaction
between actors, my approach is to bring in third parties
and look at the indirect relations between two actors in-
volved in the nationalist discourse, based on the patterns
of their interaction with these third parties. In network
analytic terms, this implies using the method of struc-
tural equivalence analysis to tease out the hidden struc-
tures of nationalist discourse networks.
2. ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ in Political and Ideological
Discourses: Established Practices
The general nature of the intergroup relationship has
been identified and largely discussed by the social psy-
chological literature (e.g., Hogg & Abrams, 1998; Tajfel
& Turner, 1986). While the latter is mostly focused on
behavioural aspects of intergroup relations, Billig (2009)
has emphasized the roles of text and talk in the repro-
duction of group identities. Critical discourse analysts
have further studied patterns of ideological reproduction
by embedding the social psychological understanding of
intergroup relations in discourse analytic theories and
methods (Fairclough, 1995; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, &
Liebhart, 2009). These studies mostly focus on, for ex-
ample, references to pronouns, such as ‘us,’ ‘them,’ ‘we,’
‘they,’ or to other deictic words such as ‘here,’ ‘there,’
etc. Also, by deconstructing a text content qualitatively,
they try to link discourse structures to power structures
(van Dijk, 1993, 2012). While all of these studies ac-
knowledge the importance of the actors, few of them, if
any, analyse systematically the actor structure of the dis-
course, which leaves patterns of actor interaction in the
nationalist discourse understudied.
More recent studies of political discourses have ad-
dressed these challenges by extending the scope of the
material analysed, both in terms of its amount and the
information coded, thus allowing more formalized ana-
lyses over time. Particularly important in this regard is
the research on political claims analysis (Koopmans &
Statham, 1999), which combines the quantitative rigor
of protest event analysis with the qualitative depth of po-
litical discourse analysis. However, the relational aspects
between senders and addressees of claims, and the re-
sulting discourse structures, have not been greatly ex-
plored, apart from work on the debates around EU en-
largement by Adam (2007). To address the lack of atten-
tion to the relational properties of political discourses,
Leifeld (2017) suggested the discourse network analy-
sis methodology, which combines the structural depth
of critical discourse analysis and a more formalized so-
cial network analysis. It employs themethodological tool-
box for a systematic analysis of the discursive interaction
of actors based on the concepts they refer to, and the
stance they take towards issues in a policy domain. Thus,
it allows the identification of the discourse coalitions in
policy debates, and the analysis of patterns of discursive
interaction within and between those coalitions.
While this strand of the literature has substantially
advanced the systematic study of the relational struc-
tures of political discourses, its application to national-
ist discourse and, especially, its divisiveness, can be lim-
ited. The reason for this is that policy discourse is a de-
bate in its own right, wherein different actors might take
different stances towards different issues. Yet nationalist
discourse is more a discourse of hegemony rather than
a debate. It is clear that, within this discourse, mem-
bers of ethnic and/or national groups will always take
the stance in favour of their own groups, whatever the
issue concerned. Therefore, with the purpose of identify-
ing the cleavage of the ethno-national ‘self’ against the
‘other’ in the discourse, this article demonstrates how
the methodology of discourse network analysis can be
extended from using it for studying policy debates to its
utilization for ideological discourses such as nationalism.
3. New Prospects for Analysing Nationalist Discourse
In this study, nationalism is defined as a “doctrine that
people who see themselves as distinct in their culture,
history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves
in a political system that expresses and protects those
distinctive characteristics” (Snyder, 2000, p. 23). It is a
way of speaking about a nation, its boundaries, interests,
and aspirations (Brennan, 1990; Calhoun, 1997), thus,
manifested in both text and talk (van Dijk, 1998, p. 193).
Divisiveness is characteristic for the nationalist discourse,
just as it is the case with other ideological discourses
(e.g., populist discourse). The major source of this di-
visiveness is the emphasis on the distinction between
the in-group (us) and the out-group (them). Typical to
this emphasis is the expression of in-group affinity and
distrust, or sometimes even hostility and hate, towards
an out-group. The latter can frequently result in the ex-
pressed desire to exclude the members of this out-group
from certain rights or resources. In this way, groups man-
age to reaffirm their in-group cohesiveness and thus en-
sure the constant re-production of their national iden-
tities. Although, frequently, it is not the open and con-
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frontational “flag-waving” version of nationalism, but
rather the everyday “banal” form that constitutes the re-
production of national belonging (Billig, 1995). The ba-
nality of it lies in the fact that these expressions of na-
tionalism mostly remain unnoticed—for example, a flag
on a country’s parliament building, which is rarely no-
ticed by passer-by citizens. Discursive manifestations of
this banal nationalism are not benign, either. The ev-
eryday usage of such banal words as ‘us,’ ‘them,’ ‘we,’
or ‘they,’ as well as that of deictic expressions, such as
‘here,’ ‘there,’ or ‘now,’ can enhance the process of na-
tionalist re-production (Billig, 1995, pp. 93–127). I argue
that there is yet another, so far undiscovered, manifesta-
tion of banal nationalism hidden in the actor structure of
the discourse.
3.1. Theoretical Logic of the Argument
This article argues that if members of an in-group make
repetitive negative statements towards the same out-
group(s), so that these members are aware of each
other’s statements, it can strengthen the bonds within
the in-group members vis-à-vis that/those out-group(s).
Applying this logic to the nationalist discourse means
that when different members of a nation or an ethnic
group repeatedly make nationalist statements publicly,
and direct those statements towards the same other
groups, it can, on the one hand, intensify the feeling of
in-group cohesion, and on the other hand, aggravate the
aversion towards the respective out-groups. In times of
nation-building, political and social actors who have ac-
cess to the public sphere, and who need to legitimize
their position as part of the elite, respond to the group
prototypicality demands by setting and/or enhancing the
boundaries of their in-group and delimitating it from ev-
erybody else (van Knippenberg, 2011). In this process,
some out-groups might be addressed in a neutral way,
while others can be represented as existential threats to
the group self-continuity, and thus be portrayed as ene-
mies (Sani, Herrera, & Bowe, 2009). When we talk about
the re-production of the in-group cohesion through the
nationalist discourse, the exact content of their nation-
alist appeals, and how actors address each other, is
certainly of great importance. However, by focusing on
dyadic interactions between actors, we might be miss-
ing deeper structures of the discourse, which can have
a strong impact on in-group cohesion.
Instead, I propose to understand and, thus, opera-
tionalize the structure of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ in the nationalist
discourse in terms of the groups of structurally equiva-
lent actors. This implies shifting our attention from who
attacks whom to what relationships actors have with
each other, based on their interaction with other ac-
tors. More specifically, actors involved in the national-
ist discourse might not have direct relationships with
each other (i.e., sending statements to each other, in this
case), but they can be linked indirectly through the pat-
terns of their interaction with third parties. These indi-
rect relations can be defined by the similarity (or dissim-
ilarity) of actors in whom they target their nationalist ap-
peals at, in how intensive their appeals are towards spe-
cific addressees, as well as in being targeted by the same
other actors.
Nationalist discourse in the present study is consti-
tuted of instances of appealing to exclusion or express-
ing hostility, whereby at least two different ethnic or
national groups are concerned. Therefore, drawing on
the work by Maoz, Kuperman, Terris and Talmud (2006),
we can think of this similarity as the structural affinity
among actors involved in the nationalist discourse—i.e.,
actors who are structurally similar in sending nationalist
appeals to and receiving them from the same other ac-
tors form the group, members of which share the same
(in this case, exclusionary/hostile) attitudes towards the
groups that are structurally dissimilar from them. At the
same time, if we have the information on the ethnic
and/or national attribution of the actors to be analysed,
we can also find out if the clustering patterns of these
groups follow ethno-national lines and, thus, form eth-
nic/national in-groups against out-groups. In this way, we
will be able to tease out the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ structure of
the nationalist discourse systematically.
The graphical representation of this argument can
help us to understand its logic better. Figure 1. presents
confrontational discursive interaction between actors
representing three hypothetical groups labelled as A,
B, and C. Members of group A (a2 and a11) are struc-
turally similar because, on the one hand, they make
confrontational statements against the members of the
same other groups, in this case c1 and b2, and, on the
other hand, are themselves targeted by the same other
actors. Actors c1 and b2 are structurally similar as well in
that they share patters of interaction with other actors;
however, they are dissimilar from a2 and a11. In this way,
the structurally similar actors a2–a11 and c1–b2 form two
different clusters. If this type of confrontational interac-
tion occurs repeatedly in a public arena, it can strengthen
the bonds between a2 and a11, as well as between c1 and
b2. Evenmore importantly, it can exacerbate the polariza-
tion between these two clusters (i.e., a2–a11 and c1–b2).
It is then the goal of the empirical analysis to identify
whether the data on nationalist appeals collected from
the Georgian print media in 1991–2012 yield the groups
of structurally similar and dissimilar actors, and, if this
is the case, what lines these group divisions follow—are
the clusters of structurally similar actors in the discourse
divided along ethno-national lines?
3.2. Nationalist Polarization between ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’
and Elections
Embedding these theoretical propositions back to the
election–nationalism–conflict nexus is instrumental to
improve our understanding of the relationship between
elections and the divisiveness of nationalist discourse.
Both large-N studies, as well as case studies which find
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Figure 1.Network of confrontational discourse among the hypothetical groups, a graphical representation of the argument.
Notes: Capital letters stand as labels for hypothetical groups, while the respective lowercase letters represent members of
these groups.
that electoral periods are associated with the increased
likelihood of violent conflicts, assume that nationalist dis-
course intensifies during these times (Cederman et al.,
2013; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005; Snyder, 2000). Their
theoretical argument builds on the peculiarities of po-
litical competition in newly emerged states that have
embarked on the path of democratic transition. Unlike
in mature democratic countries, where losing elections
might merely mean waiting for another try in the next
round of elections, here the costs can be much higher
for politicians. Losers might face not only marginaliza-
tion frompolitical power but also oppression. Conversely,
given the level of centralization in these countries, win-
ning elections usually implies obtaining near unlimited
access not only to political power, but also to the eco-
nomic resources and coercive forces of a country. These
high election stakes and the resulting potential threats
can push actors involved in the political competition
on either side to instigate violence (Höglund, Jarstad,
& Kovacs, 2009; Wilkinson, 2004). During electoral pe-
riods, political and military actors frequently resort to
confrontational, exclusionary, and divisive nationalist
rhetoric (Mansfield& Snyder, 2009). Given these proposi-
tions, I expect that the ‘us’ and ‘them’ polarization in the
nationalist discourse present in the Georgian printmedia
of 1991–2012will be stronger during electoral periods as
compared to non-electoral years.
In addition, the first two competitive democratic elec-
tions have been identified as the most dangerous, in
terms of the likelihood of violent conflicts (Cederman
et al., 2013). Actors are supposed to be the most rad-
ical during these times due to the uncertainty of the
situation (Brancati & Snyder, 2013; Reilly, 2002). These
propositions lead me to expect that the divisiveness of
the nationalist discourse between the in-group and the
out-group should be stronger during the elections at the
beginning of the democratization period (i.e., early elec-
tions), compared to those taking place later in the period
(i.e., late elections).
4. The Story of ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ in Georgia
Georgia declared independence in 1991 after nearly
70 years of being part of the Soviet Union. Before then,
Georgia experienced only three years of being an inde-
pendent republic, between 1918 and 1921. Therefore,
when, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia
became independent and embarked on the path of de-
mocratization, questionswerewide open regardingwhat
constituted the nation, who was part of it and who not,
and, maybe most importantly, how the ethnic under-
standing of ‘Georgianness’ could be coupled with the
multi-ethnic reality of the Georgian state. Elites, who had
the access to the public sphere, faced the task of defin-
ing the boundaries of the Georgian nation and that of
delimitating it from everybody else (all the out-groups),
thereby identifying who posed a threat to the well-being
of the in-group and which other groups could be per-
ceived as friends. This process did not start with the
declaration of independence, but instead had begun
more than a decade before when the Georgian National
Independencemovement gainedmomentum. Already in
the 1970s, a group of literati from academia and the
cultural intelligentsia launched an intellectual effort to
define ‘the Georgians’ by recalling the glorious past of
the nation, identifying its ‘spiritual missions,’ as well as
laying out its political interest of self-determination and
ways in which it could develop into a future democratic
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state. Ethnicity was the central defining category here.
Obviously, part of the process was to label other ethnic
groups and nations in relation to the in-group. The num-
ber one enemy of the nation at that time was clear (the
Soviet Union), and independence was equated with the
existence of the nation. These ideas, gradually trickling
down to the general public, gained massive importance
by the end of 1980s, with the relative opening of the pub-
lic sphere in the perestroika era.
The more realistic the prospect of the dissolution
of the Soviet bloc became, the more the range of out-
groups was diversified. First, as the legal successor of the
SovietUnion and theoneholding backGeorgian indepen-
dence, sometimes even with the use of the force, Russia
was evolving into the enemy, as it was themajor threat to
the self-continuity of the in-group. Second, emerging ten-
sions with the ethnic groups residing in the autonomous
regions within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia
and demanding independence from the Georgian state,
created another stratum of out-groups—Abkhazians and
South Ossetians—who threatened ‘our’ political inter-
ests, inasmuch as ‘their’ demands for independence in-
timidated the in-group’s understanding of its territorial
integrity. Related to this, Armenian and Azerbaijanian
ethnicminorities residing in Georgia also began to be per-
ceived as a potential threat, in part due to the fear of a
potential repetition of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
scenarios. Several factors might explain why these fears
emerged towards these and no other minorities living
in the country: These two groups were (and still are)
the largest ethnic minorities, territorially concentrated
in two different regions of Georgia; they both were lin-
guistically and religiously different from Georgians; and,
more importantly, both of these groups had kin-states
that, similar to Georgia, at the time were undergoing
the process of nation-building as well as political self-
determination, which implied defining national and ter-
ritorial borders in relation to ‘others.’
Third, already in its initial phase, the Georgian
National Independence movement had defined the new
orientation of the emerging state asWestern democratic;
therefore, the hopewas that the countries of Europe and
the USA would stand by the in-group in its fight for in-
dependence and a democratic future. However, an em-
phasis on the uniqueness and particularity of Georgian
culture and traditions, and its difference from Western
cultures (and others), were not uncommon either. Last
but not least, becoming an independent state also im-
plied the definition of the in-group´s relationswith all the
other states on the international arena.
It must be taken into consideration that the pro-
cess of nation-building in Georgia was accompanied
with complex political dynamics during the period un-
der study (1991–2012). Right after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, three conflicts erupted almost
simultaneously—a governmental conflict that led to a
coup d’état (December 1991–January 1992), and two
ethno-territorial wars in the autonomous regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (1990–1993). After nearly
a decade of ‘frozen’ conflicts, 2008 marked the out-
break of a new wave of violence. While Russian interests
and its involvement in the wars of the early 1990s was
obvious, the war of 2008 turned into an explicit inter-
state armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The
so called August War in 2008 resulted in the recogni-
tion of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia as independent states
by Russia.
In light with these tensions within and beyond state
borders, appealing to nationalist sentiments has not
been unknown for political contestation in Georgia. The
first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, for ex-
ample, frequently referred to the idealization of past
glories of the Georgian nation (Jones, 2013, pp. 51–74).
As Wheatley (2005, pp. 51–63) argues, Gamsakhurdia
was able to exploit the existing fears of Georgian citizens
by portraying ethnic minorities as a ‘fifth column’ act-
ing in Russia’s interests. Labelling political opposition, or
any other opponent, as an ‘agent of KGB,’ ‘the enemy of
the nation,’ ‘the traitor,’ etc., was also not uncommon in
Gamsakhurdia’s speeches. Some authors also attribute
the escalation of violence in the region of Abkhazia to the
local power struggles within the State Council of Georgia
(the former Military Council) between the warlords and
Eduard Shevardnadze, the Head of the Council at that
time and future President of the country (Jones, 2013,
p. 95; Nodia, 1998, p. 34;Wheatley, 2005, p. 70). This pat-
tern of utilizing nationalist discourse in political competi-
tion has persisted even after the Rose Revolution, which
brought to power young reformers led by President
Saakashvili. Nationalism under Saakashvili’s government
showed some diversionary tendencies, i.e., constantly
emphasizing the threat Georgia faced from Russia, and
frequently using these threats to de-legitimize opposi-
tion within the country. Perhaps, the most vivid example
of this was a fake news report about the start of the war
that aired on the TV channel, Imedi, during primetime
on March 13th, 2010. It was widely believed that Imedi
was controlled by the government, partly because of its
openly pro-government bias, and due to the fact that
the broadcaster was run by Giorgi Arveladze, a long-time
ally of Saakashvili and a former member of his party and
cabinet. The 30-minute fake news report suggested that
Russian troops were invading the capital of Georgia, and
went so far as to report the assassination of President
Saakashvili, all of which sparked mass panic across the
country. One of the main messages transmitted by the
report was that the leaders of the Georgian political op-
position were supporting and legitimizing the Russian in-
tervention. After the report, the television anchor said
that its aimwas to showwhat could happen, subtly point-
ing to the threats opposition posed to the country (“Fake
report on renewed war,” 2010; Mtivlishvili, 2010).
Bearing in mind this background information about
the nation-building process and political struggles that
took place in Georgia across the period of its democrati-
zation between 1991–2012, the major goal of the study
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is to identify whether and how this nationalist divisive-
ness was reflected in the structures of the discourse.
5. Data and Method
The analysis in this article relies entirely on the original
data on nationalist appeals collected during an extensive
content analysis of six Georgian newspapers between
1991 and 2012. Information regarding the newspaper se-
lection, sampling, and coding procedures is provided in
the Supplementary File. The data consists of 1,186 news-
paper articles, out of which 809 were identified as being
related to the topics of interest (ethnicity, ethnic or gov-
ernmental conflicts, and political institutions) and, there-
fore, further analysed at appeal level. Out of the 4,541
appeals identified in these articles, 13.4% were coded as
nationalist. Statements were coded as nationalist if they
referred to the exclusion from certain political/civil rights
of other actors, or expressed hostile attitudes towards
them, and if at least two ethnic/national groups were
involved. Therefore, the network of the nationalist dis-
course in this study by default represents a negative and
confrontational interaction between actors.
Given the conceptualization of nationalist discourse
in this study, the latter is conceived as a set of ele-
ments including: the actual content of appeals; the con-
stellation of actors around these appeals (represented
as senders or addressees); and patterns of interaction
among actors, as well as between actors and the content
of the appeals. Hence, the nationalist discourse in this
study is represented as a (discourse) network, wherein
actors are engaged in nationalist interaction among each
other. As this relational nature of the data requires a
method that has the properties of analysing structural
aspects, social network analysis is considered to be the
most effective approach to be used here. According to
the theoretical propositions of the study, the major goal
is to identify if certain actors involved in the discourse
cluster in groups based on their structural similarities,
and whether the boundaries of these clusters follow
ethno-national lines. It is the claim of this study that in
this way we can identify and measure the divisiveness
of nationalist discourse. Structural equivalence analysis
is utilized exactly for this reason: to detect the extent
of structural similarities between the actors and to map
their clustering patterns.
Studying the divisiveness of nationalist discourse
using structural equivalence analysis, and social net-
work analysis in general, is innovative because it has
never been done before. Applying social network analy-
sis methods for analysing policy discourses has already
been proven to be effective (Adam, 2007; Fisher,Waggle,
& Leifeld, 2013). Some authors have also demonstrated
the usefulness of structural equivalence analysis specifi-
cally for studying polarization patterns in policy debates
(Fisher, Leifeld, & Iwaki, 2013). This study shows how
the method of structural equivalence analysis can be uti-
lized to tease out the hidden structures of nationalist dis-
course more effectively, as compared to a mere count of
word frequencies or qualitative accounts of small num-
bers of texts.
Nodes are defined as all the actors who are men-
tioned by the articles either as senders or as addressees
of the nationalist discourse. For all the actors coded, the
data also includes information on their attribution to eth-
nic groups or nationality. This article is not interested
in how much effect the nationalist appeals of a certain
set of actors have on nationalist mobilization, as com-
pared to others. Rather, it is primarily interested in a
general nationalist discourse that is present in a public
sphere. Therefore, while theoretically the weights of na-
tionalist appeals might vary in terms of their capacity
for mobilization, depending on who makes an appeal
(Conversi, 1995; Hroch, 1985; Kedourie, 1993; Snyder,
2000), this study does not differentiate empirically be-
tween the leading ethnic entrepreneurs and actors on
the fringes of a movement. It rather takes ‘elite’ as a cu-
mulative unit and conceives the fact that an actor is given
a voice in media as a proxy of being a potential agent of
ethnic entrepreneurship.
The edges are defined as the number of statements
with which actors target each other. Thus, the networks,
and their respective adjacency matrices, in this analysis
are directed and asymmetric. Edges represent not only
the existence of a link but also its strength. Entries on
a diagonal of the matrix are not meaningful since the oc-
currence of an actor sending a nationalist appeal to itself
is not considered.
The goal of the analysis is to identify the clusters of
actors that are related with each other indirectly, based
on similarities in who they attack with their nationalist
appeals, how intense these attacks are, as well as who
they receive attacks from. In network analytic terms, this
means that an actor i is similar to an actor j if both i and j
are linked to an actor k. Actors i and j do not need to be
directly related to each other. Using the method of struc-
tural equivalence analysis, we will be able to compare
the interaction profiles of all the actor dyads involved
in the discourse and thereby determine their structural
similarity and dissimilarity (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson,
2013; Lorrain & White, 1971). Interaction profile here
refers to all the out-going, as well as in-coming, ties of
an actor. Since the network is directed, the interaction
profile of an actor i in the socio-matrix represents all
the entries adjacent to this actor both in its respective
row and the column. Structural similarity is measured
using Pearson Correlation Coefficient. This choice over
Jaccard Coefficient and Euclidean distance is guided by
two factors. First, the data is not binary but count; and
second, the study is primarily interested in the patterns
of similarities rather than dissimilarities between the ac-
tor profiles.
The structural equivalence analysis proceeds in sev-
eral successive steps. First, the profile analysis of each
actor dyad is conducted by calculating the correlation co-
efficients between their respective rows and columns in
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the adjacency matrix X. Second, the resulting correlation
matrix C is constructed in which every entry ij represents
a correlation coefficient between the interaction profiles
of actors i and j—thus, the extent to which these two ac-
tors are structurally equivalent. The correlation matrix C
is undirected, i.e., symmetric, and therefore the correla-
tion coefficient in the entry (i, j) is the same as that in
the entry (j, i). The stronger the correlation between two
actors, i.e., the closer the coefficient is to +1, the more
structurally equivalent these actors are.
The correlation matrix does not allow the identifica-
tion of patterns easily, so, in order to separate the groups
of structurally similar actors from those who are dissimi-
lar, the next step is to partition them into mutually exclu-
sive clusters based on their degree of structural equiva-
lence. Actors who are structurally more equivalent will
be grouped together in a cluster and separated from
other clusters comprised of the actors who are struc-
turally less similar (Wasserman & Faust, 2009, p. 376). In
order to account for the robustness of the clustering pat-
terns of actors, the analysis in this section utilizes two
alternative methods of partitioning—hierarchical cluster
analysis and multidimensional scaling. The first method
subdivides nodes into subsets of actors who are struc-
turally equivalent at level 𝛼. The procedure is called
hierarchical because partitioning occurs at successively
less restrictive values of 𝛼 (Wasserman & Faust, 2009,
p. 381). The second method uses spatial technique to
represent the structural similarity and dissimilarity of ac-
tors based on their spatial proximity in two-dimensional
space (Wasserman & Faust, 2009, p. 387). Structurally
more equivalent actors are located closer to each other,
while less equivalent actors are placed further away, thus
forming groups of those who are similar, and separat-
ing them from those who are different. This analysis is
performed using the social network analysis software,
UCINET. All the respective correlation matrices can be
found in the Supplementary File.
Further, electoral periods are defined as the election
date, three months before, and onemonth after it. Since
the sample contains four months in each year, electoral
periods are understood as electoral years, i.e., the years
in which elections were held. Non-electoral years are de-
fined as a random sample of four months in each year
without elections. In addition, in line with Cederman et
al. (2013), early elections are understood as the first
two competitive national level elections, which, in the
Georgian case, means the elections of 1991 and 1992.
All national elections starting from 1995 were coded as
late elections.
6. ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ as Structural Equivalence in the
Georgian Print Media
Does the partitioning of structurally equivalent actors in-
volved in the nationalist discourse in the Georgian news-
papers yield groups corresponding to the case-specific
‘us’ vs. ‘them’?
The analysis starts by contrasting the clustering pat-
terns of the structurally equivalent actors in the nation-
alist discourse with that of the non-nationalist discourse.
The comparison presented in Figures 2 and 3. demon-
strates an immediate difference between the two graphs.
Actors involved in the nationalist discourse (Figure 2)
form two clusters clearly delimitated from each other at
the level 𝛼 = 0.142.
Looking at the ethnic or national attribution of actors
in these clusters, we can easily identify that the right side
of the graph is completely homogenous, represented
only by the Georgian actors, while the cluster on the left
side is rather mixed, comprised of all the other ethno-
national groups. The clustering pattern of the nationalist
discourse in Figure 2 reflects several essential points: The
media gives voice predominantly to the members of the
in-group (i.e., Georgian actors) and, therefore, the latter
are systematically similar in being the dominant senders
of the nationalist appeals present in themedia discourse;
the members of the in-group are also systematically sim-
ilar in directing nationalist statements to the same other
groups; moreover, they are similar in how intense their
nationalist statements are towards specific other actors.
As the values of 𝛼 become restrictive in Figure 2,
the cluster of ‘them’ is being divided into subsequent
sub-clusters. The West and international organizations—
actors perceived by the Georgian state as potential
allies and sources of material and non-material aid—
are grouped together (𝛼 = 0.396). Actors with whom
Georgians have experienced ethno-political tensions and
violent conflicts (i.e., Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia,
the Soviet Union, and other ethnic minorities concen-
trated in Georgia) are grouped together (𝛼 = 0.523). As
the clustering becomes more fine-grained, the two eth-
nic groups with whom Georgians have experienced vio-
lent conflicts and have not resolved those conflicts to
date—Abkhazians and South Ossetians—form one clus-
ter (𝛼 = 0.844). It is surprising to observe the actor
Georgians on the right of Figure 2 among the out-groups.
This, however, can be explained by the fact that, when
addressed by nationalist appeals, Georgian actors might
be referred in such a cumulative way in order to empha-
size the category of ethnicity. Contrary to this picture,
the clustering pattern of actors in non-nationalist ap-
peals (Figure 3) does not reveal any theoretically mean-
ingful groups, i.e., actors are mixed across clusters when
considering their ethno-national attribution. Thus, the
exploratory analysis of the group structure of the dis-
course in the Georgian printmedia shows that compared
to the regular, non-nationalist appeals, nationalist dis-
course entails the actor structure, whereby the mem-
bers of the in-group are systematically similar in directing
their nationalist statements to the same other groups.
To test the robustness of these clustering patterns,
the correlation matrices were submitted to multidimen-
sional scaling, an alternative method of partitioning. The
results from this analysis are presented in Figures 4 and 5,
which compare the spatial distribution of the structurally
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Figure 4.Multidimensional scaling of structurally equivalent actors in nationalist appeals. Notes: Multidimensional scaling
is used as an alternative visual representation of the clustering pattern of structurally equivalent actors in Figure 2. Nodes
here represent actors. Proximity among these nodes visualizes the degree of structural similarity among actors. The red
line is inserted manually in order to illustrate the divide more clearly. Stress = 0.187.
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equivalent actors in nationalist and non-nationalist ap-
peals. Similar to the results of the hierarchical cluster-
ing, the comparison here reveals an immediate differ-
ence between the two. In the multidimensional scaling
picture of the nationalist appeals (Figure 4), Georgian ac-
tors alone dominate the lower right corner of the graph,
while all the other ethno-national groups of actors are
located in the upper left corner. Thus, the divisive struc-
ture of the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ discourse is maintained. In con-
trast, themultidimensional scaling of the non-nationalist
appeals (Figure 5) yields a fully mixed picture, i.e., the
spatial distribution of the actors does not form any clus-
ter whatsoever.
The next step is to test whether and how the cluster-
ing patterns identified above are affected by electoral pe-
riods. This analysis will also serve the additional function
of ruling out the possibility that the patterns identified in
the exploratory analysis are an artefact of the definition
of the nationalist appeals in this study, thus validating
the proposed method of measurement.
Figures 6 and 7 compare multidimensional scaling
of structurally equivalent actors in the nationalist dis-
course during electoral years to that of the non-electoral
years. In line with the stated expectation, this compar-
ison shows that the nationalist discourse differs in its
divisiveness depending on what period we look at. The
two camps of ‘us’ (all the Georgians) and ‘them’ (every-
body else) is clearly visible in the nationalist discourse of
the electoral periods (Figure 6), while we cannot identify
the same clustering pattern in the nationalist appeals for
non-electoral years (Figure 7).We can see from the struc-
ture of the nationalist appeals during electoral years that
the West and international organizations are also clearly
delimited from the actors with which Georgians have ex-
perienced ethno-political conflicts.
The finding reveals that nationalist discourse be-
comes more intense during electoral periods not only
because actors with stakes in elections make national-
ist appeals more frequently, but also because the gen-
eral structure of the discourse becomes more divisive,
yielding sharper divisions between the in-group and
out-groups. Apart from revealing how nationalist dis-
course becomes more divisive during elections, this find-
ing also serves as an important validation of the pro-
posed method of measuring the actor structure of the
nationalist discourse. As the comparison here was made,
not between the nationalist and non-nationalist appeals,
but within the nationalist discourse itself, it has demon-
strated that the identified patterns do not stem from the
rules of coding nationalist appeals in this study.
Figures 8 and 9 look deeper into the nationalist dis-
course during electoral periods and explore whether
early electoral periods are more prone to divisive dis-
course than the later ones. In line with the literature at-
tributing particular risks of conflict to the first and second
elections after independence, findings from this analysis
show that early elections in Georgia are indeed differ-
ent from later elections in terms of strong polarization
between the national ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The spatial distri-
bution of the structurally equivalent actors in Figure 8
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Figure 6.Multidimensional scaling of structurally equivalent actors in nationalist appeals during electoral periods. Nodes
represent actors. Proximity among these nodes visualizes their degree of structural similarity based on correlation coefi-
cients. The red line is inserted manually in order to illustrate the divide more clearly. Stress = 0.154.
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Figure 8. Multidimensional scaling of structurally equivalent actors in nationalist appeals during early electoral periods.
Notes: Nodes represent actors. Proximity among these nodes visualizes their degree of structural similarity based on cor-
relation coeficients. The red line is inserted manually in order to illustrate the divide more clearly. Stress = 0.087.
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Figure 9. Multidimensional scaling of structurally equivalent actors in nationalist appeals during late electoral periods.
Notes: Nodes represent actors. Proximity among these nodes visualizes their degree of structural similarity based on cor-
relation coeficients. Stress = 0.133.
shows that the distance between the two clusters is par-
ticularly large during early elections.
Certain actor clusters also exist in the discourse
of late electoral periods (Figure 9). For example, the
West and international organizations are in closer prox-
imity with each other than with Georgian actors, or
the actors with which Georgians have experienced ten-
sions and/or violent conflict. The same holds true for
Abkhazia, Autonomous Regions, Russia and the Soviet
Union. Although the external actors here are repre-
sented as part of the in-group, a clear-cut delineation be-
tween the in-group and out-groups, with the clusters sit-
uated so far from each other in Figure 8 indicates that na-
tionalist polarization between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is indeed
stronger during early electoral periods as compared to
the later electoral periods.
7. Conclusions
Adding to the already established practices of analysing
in-group/out-group divisions in ideological and political
discourses and extending on the discourse network ana-
lysis methodology, this article proposes an innovative
way of studying the divisiveness of the nationalist dis-
course using the social network analysis method of struc-
tural equivalence analysis. The practical applicability of
this approach was demonstrated by analysing the rela-
tionship between the instances of increased political par-
ticipation during democratic transition and the national-
ist ‘us’ and ‘them’ polarization in the Georgian print me-
dia of 1991–2012. The findings suggest that during elec-
toral periods nationalist discourse intensifies not only in
terms of its degree, i.e., nationalist statements become
more frequent, but also in terms of its kind, i.e., the ac-
tor structure of the discourse yields sharper divisions be-
tween the in-group and the out-groups.
There are good reasons to think that the exogenous
shock of the 2008 war might have affected the patterns
of divisiveness of nationalist discourse in the Georgian
print media. More precisely, the clustering structure of
the discourse during the next few rounds of elections af-
ter 2008 would have probably reflected increased ten-
sions with certain out-groups. However, as the first elec-
tions after the 2008 war only took place in 2012 and the
data that this study relies on covers the period only up
until the end of 2012, it does not provide enough data
points to conduct structural equivalence analysis of the
nationalist discourse in this period. This limitation of the
study needs to be improved through further research of
the effects of such factors on the divisiveness of the na-
tionalist discourse.
The implications of this study can be understood in
relation to what Billig calls “banal nationalism” (1995).
The latter sees nationhood as reproduced daily through
ideological habits, which remain unnamed and unno-
ticed. The divisive actor constellation of the nationalist
discourse in the media identified in this study is, thus,
yet another manifestation of ‘banal nationalism.’ It is not
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readily recognizable for a reader, and thus goes unno-
ticed. However, if we agree that the news media con-
tributes to the construction of reality through its content,
this deep discursive structure, which yields such a sharp
division between the national in-group and the out-
groups, has the potential to reinforce cohesion among
the in-group members, but, at the same time, fire up an-
tagonism towards the out-group members. Yet, the find-
ings from this analysis should be taken only as a start-
ing point. While this study has discovered that the struc-
tures of the nationalist appeals in the Georgian print me-
dia of the democratization period convey a strong ‘us’
vs. ‘them’ polarization, through the actor constellation
of this discourse, further empirical research is needed
to examine, first, to what extent is the pattern observed
here identifiable in other cases, and second, to what
extent these discursive structures affect the actual in-
group/out-group polarization among media consumers.
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